The End of Innocence: The Effect of
California's Recreational Use Statute on
Children at Play*
One hundred years ago, the idea that children deserved special
protection from dangerous conditions found on private property was
adopted by both the United States and California Supreme Courts.
Due to the innocence of children and their inability to perceive
possible dangers, landowners were required to provide a higher
degree of protection to children than to adults. This new and
revolutionary idea, later to be labeled the attractive nuisance
doctrine, was adopted by the Restatement of Torts in what has been
called its "most effective single section. "1 However, today in
California, a recent decision has reversed a century of development
in the law which had provided protection to children. The duty of
care required of a landowner towards the children of this state has
returned to that which existed over one hundred years ago.
INTRODUCTION
The State of California is blessed with an abundance of scenic
treasures. Its natural landscape contains over 1,100 miles of Pacific shoreline,
massive mountains, magnificent lakes and sweeping deserts. Such diversity
and contrast lend to its appeal as a place where recreational pursuits may
flourish, at times on realty owned by others. 2

The opening words of Ornelas v. Randolph demonstrate the California
Legislature's intent behind the state's recreational use statute, California
Civil Code section 846, which reduces the duty of care that landowners

* The author wishes to express her gratitude to Professor Edmund Ursin for his
invaluable insight and critique of this Comment.
I. William L. Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 CAL. L. REV. 427, 435 (1959).
2. Ornelas v. Randolph, 4 Cal. 4th 1095, 1098, 847 P.2d 560, 561, 17 Cal. Rptr.
2d 594, 595 (1993) (en bane).
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owe to those using the land for recreational purposes.3 Since its
enactment in 1963, this statute has been subject to numerous interpretations by the appellate courts in their attempts to apply a law based on
the term "recreation," a term so vague and subject to individual
interpretation that a suitable legal definition for it may be impossible.
The legislative history (or lack thereof) that accompanies the statute has
provided little direction to the courts in deciding cases before them. As
the Ninth Circuit recently noted, "[u]nfortunately the Legislature has
been silent about its underlying intent in enacting section Civil Code
846."4 The appellate courts have generally been guided by attempting
to balance the need for increased recreational area with the concern of
landowners regarding liability to entrants who use private land for
recreation. In the past, the courts based their decisions on whether
immunizing a landowner from the general duty of care owed to entrants
would support the presumed legislative intent of encouraging landowners
to open their private lands for recreational use. 5
The Ornelas decision appears to depart from this approach, which had
been followed for thirty years. In Ornelas, the court determined that a
landowner owed no duty of care to a trespassing child who entered
private property, presumably to play on old farm machinery stored by
the owner. 6 In discussing the "recreational opportunities offered by the
property," the court employed an extremely broad interpretation of the
recreational use statute and applied its benefit, an immunization from the
duty of care, to private property that was neither suitable nor desirable
for recreational purposes. 7 This interpretation by the Ornelas court may
have been influenced by a growing trend towards limiting the liability
of landowners, possibly indicating a dissatisfaction with the inclusion of
trespassers in the group towards whom one owes a duty of care.
However, the Ornelas decision singles out the group of individuals least
able to take responsibility for the decision to trespass and least able to
protect themselves---children. One hundred years of progress in the duty

3. CAL. CIV. CODE§ 846 (West 1982).
4. Mansion v. United States, 945 F.2d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Nelsen
v. City of Gridley, 113 Cal. App. 3d 87, 91, 169 Cal. Rptr. 757,759 (1980)).
5. E.g., id. at 1117; Parish v. Lloyd, 82 Cal. App. 3d 785, 788, 147 Cal. Rptr.
431, 432 (1978).
6. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1098, 847 P.2d at 561, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595. The
defendant, Randolph, owned a large piece of property. On one open part he stored old
farm equipment, machinery, and irrigation pipes. The plaintiff, eight-year-old Jose
Ornelas, lived adjacent to the Randolph property in a residential subdivision. Ornelas
and five other children entered the property uninvited and began playing on the old
machinery. Although Ornelas was actually just sitting and watching the others play, a
piece of pipe dislodged and fell on him. Id.
7. Id. at 1102, 847 P.2d at 564, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598.
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of care society owes to its children may have been reversed by the
application of the recreational use statute to children who trespass in
order to play on private property.
This Comment will consider the history and purpose of California's
recreational use statute and the interpretations and revisions of the statute
prior to Ornelas. The separate policy of protecting young children will
also be discussed, considering how California advanced this policy with
the adoption of the "attractive nuisance" doctrine - the Restatement of
Torts position on the standard of care owed to trespassing children.
Next, this Comment will discuss how the recreational use statute may
now play a role in limiting a general duty of care owed to trespassing
children by creating a special class of citizens to whom no duty is owed,
conflicting with the long-standing policy of increased care toward
children. Finally, this Comment will conclude by making recommendations on the steps that the California Legislature and/or courts should
take in order to provide California's children with the protection they
received prior to Ornelas.

I.

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RECREATIONAL USE
STATUTE AND LANDOWNER LIABILITY

Americans value the tremendous variety and opportunity for recreational activities this country provides. In 1962, the Outdoor Recreation
Resources Review Commission released a report with proposals designed
to "satisfy our outdoors needs into the next century," however, a 1987
follow-up report found that "by the late 1970s, participation in some
activities had surpassed the rates [the Outdoor Recreation Resources
Review Commission] projected for the year 2000."8 As anyone who
has recently been to any of our more popular national parks knows, the
strain on a limited number of facilities has become enormous. Reservation requirements, long lines, and large crowds have become the norm.
An awareness of the need for additional recreational areas has turned
attention to privately owned lands that could serve this demand. 9

8. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON AMERICANS OUTDOORS, AMERICANS OUTDOORS:
THE LEGACY, THE CHALLENGE 15 (1987).

9. Id. at 19. The report recognizes that the competition for available land suitable
for recreational use is increasing due to more people doing many different things. The
private sector could help ease this burden, however, barriers to investment due to a
"liability crisis" prevent landowners from increasing public access. Id. The commission
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However, private owners have been wary of potential liability for
entrants injured when using their property and have been unwilling to
open their land for public use. Recreational use statutes were developed
to ease this burden.
Michigan enacted the country's first recreational use statute in
1953 .10 Less than one-third of the states had enacted similar legislation
by 1965, when the Council of State Governments proposed a model act
for public recreation on private lands. 11 However, by 1989, at least
forty-nine states had enacted recreational use statutes. 12 Many of the
statutes are patterned after the model act, but there are wide variations
among the statutes, especially among those that predate the model act. 13
Aside from the individual differences, however, the basic effect is the
same. As stated in the suggested legislation, such statutes are "designed
to encourage availability of private lands by limiting the liability of
owners." Further, "where private owners are willing to make their land
available to members of the general public without charge . . . every
reasonable encouragement should be given to them." 14
Section 846 of the California Civil Code was enacted in 1963, two
years before the suggested legislation was proposed. The Act limited the
liability of property owners toward persons entering their land for certain
recreational purposes. 15 The legislature did not include a statement of

recommended increasing incentives to private landowners in order to increase public
access and use for recreational purposes. Id.
10. Act of June 10, 1953, 1953 Mich. Pub. Acts 201 (codified at MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 300.201 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995)).
11. 24 SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 150 (Council of State Gov'ts 1965).
12. N. Linda Goldstein et al., Recreational Use Statutes--Time for Reform, PROB.
& PROP., July-Aug. 1989, at 6, 7.
13. Robin C. Miller, Annotation, Effect of Statute Limiting Landowner's Liability
for Personal Injury to Recreational User, 47 A.L.R.4TH 262, 271 (1986).
14. SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, supra note 11, at 150. The model act also
suggests that the title conform to state requirements, such as: "An act to encourage
landowners to make land and water areas available to the public by limiting liability in
connection therewith." Id. Section 1 of the act specifies the purpose, and states: "The
purpose of this act is to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas
available to the public for recreational purposes by limiting their liability toward persons
entering thereon for such purposes." Id. The California act contains no such statement
of purpose.
15. Act of July 17, 1963, ch. 1759, 1963 Cal. Stat. 3511 (codified as amended at
CAL. CIV. CODE§ 846 (West 1982)).
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purpose or further clarify the intent through legislative history. 16 The
statute, when enacted in 1963, read in full as follows:
An owner of any estate in real property owes no duty of care to keep the
premises safe for entry or use by others for taking of fish and game, camping,
water sports, hiking or sightseeing, or to give any warning of hazardous
conditions, uses of, structures, or activities on such premises to persons entering
for such purposes, except as provided in this section.
An owner of any estate in real property who gives pennission to another to
take fish and game, camp, hike or sightsee upon the premises does not thereby
(a) extend any assurance that the premises are safe for such purpose, or (b)
constitute the person to whom pennission has been granted the legal status of
an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed, or (c) assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person or property caused by any
act of such person to whom pennission has been granted except as provided in
this section.
This section does not limit the liability which otherwise exists (a) for willful
or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use,
structure or activity; or (b) for injury suffered in any case where pennission to
take fish and game, camp, hike or sightsee was granted for a consideration other
than the consideration, if any, paid to said landowner by the State; or (c) to any
persons who are expressly invited rather than merely pennitted to come upon
the premises by the landowner.
Nothing in this section creates a duty of care or ground of liability for injury
to person or property. 17

As demonstrated by the wording of the statute, the original form of the
act was very specific as to the activities that would constitute recreational use. The activities listed were limited to those activities for which
state and national parks are normally used. It appears that the implicit
purpose of the statute was to ease the burden on public recreational areas
by easing the fear of liability for private landowners who allow such
activities on their land. 18 Private land that can be used for such
recreational activities can provide additional space for people who would
otherwise be using the limited number of public parks available. By

16. Id.; see also 38 CAL. ST. B.J. 647 (1963); Ornelas v. Randolph, 4 Cal. 4th
1095, 1105-06 n.8, 847 P.2d 560, 564 n.8, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594, 601 n.8 (1993) (en
bane) (legislative history inconclusive); Nelsen v. City of Gridley, 113 Cal. App. 3d 87,
91, 169 Cal. Rptr. 757, 759 (1980) (legislature silent about underlying intent); Donaldson
v. United States, 653 F.2d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1981) (history provides insufficient insight
as to intent of legislature).
17. Act of July 17, 1963, ch. 1759, 1963 Cal. Stat. 3511 (codified as amended at
CAL. CIV. CODE§ 846 (West 1982)).
18. See, e.g., Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. No. 2028 v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.
3d 699, 707-08, 660 P.2d 1168, 1173, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494, 499 (1983); Parish v. Lloyd,
82 Cal. App. 3d 785, 147 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1978).
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reducing the duty of care that a landowner might normally owe, the
legislature is encouraging private owners to allow specific recreational
activities on their land. 19
At the time California's recreational use statute was enacted, the duty
of care required of a landowner was based on the traditional common
law classification of the entrant. Prior to 1968 and California's
landmark decision of Rowland v. Christian,20 the legal duty of a
landowner was based on the status of the entrant--either an invitee,
licensee, or trespasser. 21
An invitee was owed a full duty of care. When a visitor entered an
owner's property upon invitation and for business concerning the owner,
the owner had an affirmative duty to protect the visitor from known
dangers and to use reasonable care to discover unknown dangers. 22 In
other words, the owner had a duty to make the premises safe in
exchange for the pecuniary benefit he expected to receive. An invitation
to enter private land for the owner's benefit justified the entrant's
expectation that the property would be safe. When no benefit was
expected, the entrarit did not qualify as an invitee, and a full duty of care
was not owed. An additional definition of invitee was adopted by the
Second Restatement of Torts in section 332.23 An invitee would also
include a person invited to enter or remain on land as a member of the
public for purposes for which the land was held open to the public.24
In such cases, an implied representation was made to the public that
because the land was held open to them, it had been prepared for their
safe entry.25
A licensee was a visitor entering by consent or permission.26 In
contrast to an invitee, a licensee came onto the premises for her own
purpose or benefit, rather than for the landowner's benefit. A social
guest fell into this classification, as did those who entered with
permission for purposes unrelated to the owner's benefit, such as for
recreational use, use as a shortcut, and use by sales persons and
solicitors. 27 Permission could be express or could be implied by the
19. See, e.g., Delta Farms, 33 Cal. 3d at 708, 660 P.2d at 1173, 190 Cal. Rptr. at
499.
20. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). See infra note 42 for
a discussion of facts.
21. E.g., 6 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW§ 894 (9th ed. 1988).
22. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 61,
at 419 (5th ed. 1984).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1965).
24. Id.
25. KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, at 422.
26. WITKIN, supra note 21, § 909.
27. KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, at 413.
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owner's conduct, or even the condition of the land. 28 Permission did
not, however, elevate the status of the entrant to an invitee. Encouragement to enter without added assurance, implied or express, that the
premises were safe for the visit did not make the owner fully liable for
the condition of the land. The limited duty owed to the licensee was a
duty to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring the licensee, to refrain
from conducting dangerous activities where the presence of the licensee
was or should reasonably have been known, and to warn of dangerous
conditions known by the landowner when there was reason to believe the
licensee would not discover the condition by herself. 29 In all other
situations, a licensee assumed the risk of the condition of the premises
and had no right to demand that the premises be safe. In the case of the
social guest, the theory was that the guest was placed on the same
footing as the family and was expected to use the property as the owner
did, with no special inspection or preparation for the guest's safety. 30
The final category was that of the trespasser. In general, the
landowner owed no duty of care to unknown, uninvited entrants. 31 A
landowner had a duty to refrain from intentionally harming the
trespasser, but was under no duty to keep the premises safe. This
exemption from general liability developed historically from a policy to
allow unrestrained use of private land. 32 A wide variety of privileges
accompanied land ownership due to the importance of land throughout
the development of law in England and America and due to the
dominance of the English landowning classes in the social and political
development of society and the common law.33 The landowner was
given legally protected, exclusive possession, including the right to
consent to entrants on the owner's terms. Where there was no right or

28. Id.
29. WITKIN, supra note 21, § 909.
30. KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, at 414.
31. WITKIN, supra note 21, § 905. Two classes of trespassers are distinguished.
A landowner must only refrain from intentional harms and willful, wanton injury to an
unknown trespasser. Once a trespasser becomes known, however, the landowner has a
duty to warn of artificial conditions that are concealed dangers and to use reasonable
care in hazardous activities.
32. KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, § 57; Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Modern
Status of Rules Conditioning Landowner's Liability Upon Status of Injured Party as
Invitee, Licensee, or Trespasser; 22 A.L.R.4TH 294, 299 (1983).
33. Gulbis, supra note 32, at 299.
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permission to enter, entrants were expected to look out for themselves.34
An exception to the no-duty rule for trespassers developed, however,
in the special case of child trespassers. An adult trespasser was expected
to understand the possible dangers and assume the risk of uninvited
entry. However, young children were thought to be incapable of
perceiving potential danger or making intelligent decisions regarding
trespass. 35 Society's strong interest in the protection of children
overshadowed the landowner's interest in the unrestricted freedom to use
his or her land, especially when the landowner might have been the only
one available to protect children from a danger existing on the property. 36 The Restatement of Torts adopted a special rule for child trespassers with the attractive nuisance doctrine, which bases liability on the
foreseeability of harm to trespassing children and is actually simple
negligence law. 37 This section has been called the Restatement 's "most

34. Id. at 294.
35. KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, § 59, at 399; Prosser, supra note l, at 429.
36.· KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, § 59, at 399.
37. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS§ 339 (1934); Prosser, supra note l, at 432. The rule
for trespassing children was stated in the Restatement as follows:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm to young children
trespassing thereon caused by a structure or other artificial condition which he
maintains upon the land, if ·
(a) the place where the condition is maintained is one upon which the
possessor knows or should know that such children are likely to trespass,
and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or should know
and which he realizes or should realize as involving an unreasonable risk
of death or serious bodily harm to such children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or
realize the risk involved in intermeddling in it or in coming within the
area made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is slight as
compared to the risk to young children involved therein.
RESTATEMENT, supra.
The term "attractive nuisance" is actually a misnomer. The term came about as the
courts attempted to justify a special rule for trespassing children in terms of negligence
even though a landowner ordinarily would have owed no duty of care toward a
trespasser. Prosser, supra note ·1, at 431. The idea was that if a dangerous condition
attracted the child onto the land, the landowner could not claim immunity based on the
trespass. Id. Due to this interpretation, the early cases applying the doctrine predicated
liability on a finding that the child was lured or enticed onto the land. E.g., United Zinc
& Chem. Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268 (1922). The necessity of allurement was later
discarded by the majority of courts, although the name "attractive nuisance" remained
and is still commonly used. Prosser, supra note l, at 448; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 332 cmt. b (1965). California courts continue to refer to the "attractive
nuisance doctrine" even though attractive and nuisance are not requirements of the rule.
See, e.g., King v. Lennen, 53 Cal. 2d 340, 348 P.2d 98, 1 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1959);
Reynolds v. Willson, 51 Cal. 2d 94, 331 P.2d 48 (1958); Smith v. Americania Motor
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effective single section"38 due to its adoption by a majority of courts.
California has recognized the special duty of care owed to child
trespassers since 1891, when the California Supreme Court decided
Barrett v. Southern Pacific Co. 39
.
In 1968, California became the first state to reject the common law
entrant status classifications,40 although Great Britain had imposed a
general duty of care toward all entrants except trespassers in 1957.41
In Rowland v. Christian, 42 the California Supreme Court replaced the
traditional liability rules based on entrant status with a duty of ordinary
care. In doing so, the court stated that "[w]hatever may have been the
historical justifications for the common law distinctions, it is clear that
those distinctions are not justified in the light of our modern society." 43

Lodge, 39 Cal. App. 3d 1, 113 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1974); Beard v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.
Co., 4 Cal. App. 3d 129," 84 Cal. Rptr 449 (1970).
38. Prosser, supra note I, at 435.
39. 91 Cal. 296, 27 P. 666 (1891). The defendant, a railroad company,
maintained a railroad turntable within a quarter-mile of where several small children
resided with their families. The turntable was secured by a latch and slot to keep it from
turning, which was customary in the industry, but it was not protected by any inclosure
or lock. Children frequently played on the turntable and had been observed by the
defendant's employees. The plaintiff, an eight-year-old child, had gotten on the turntable
for a ride and, while on it, caught his leg between the table and the rail. The leg had
to be amputated. The California Supreme Court reasoned that if such an injury was
reasonably to have been anticipated and the defendant did not provide adequate
safeguards, the defendant railroad was guilty of negligence. The court acknowledged
that young children were incapable of exercising the reasonable care of a more mature
individual and that additional precautions were required to protect them from dangerous
conditions. Id. at 302-03, 27 P. at 667. The California decision came 18 years after the
leading United States Supreme Court case, Sioux City & Pac. R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657
(1873) (similarly involving children playing on a railroad turntable).
40. Gulbis, supra note 32, at 296 n.2.
41. Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, ch. 31 (Eng.).
42. 69 Cal. 2d 108,443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). The plaintiff had been
invited to defendant's apartment as a social guest. While using the bathroom fixtures,
the plaintiff injured his hand on a cracked faucet. The defendant had been aware of the
defect and had advised her lessors of the problem a month before-the incident. Id. at
110, 443 P.2d at 562, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 98. The California Supreme Court found for the
plaintiff, and, although it could have based its decision on the traditional duty of care
owed toward a licensee (duty to warn of dangerous condition known by landowner when
there is reason to believe that the licensee would not discover the condition by himself),
the court went much further and declared that all landowners owed an ordinary duty of
care as described by California Civil Code§ 1714. Id. at 119,443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal.
Rptr. at 104. For the text of§ 1714, see infra note 44.
43. Id. at 117, 443 P.2d at 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
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The court adopted the general duty of care requirement of Civil Code
section 171444 and ordinary negligence principles by stating:
The proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land in
accordance with section 1714 of the Civil Code is whether in the management
of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of
injury to others, and, although the plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee, or
invitee may in the light of the facts giving rise to such status have some bearing
on the question of liability, the status is not determinative. 45

Civil Code section 1714, which was originally enacted by the legislature
in 1872,46 provided the basic measure of liability. Exceptions to the
ordinary duty of care were not allowed unless they were provided by a
statutory provision or clear public policy.47 Entrant classifications no
longer supported public policy.
The decision also affected the Restatement of Torts rule involving
trespassing children. This rule described certain situations in which the
landowner would owe a greater duty of care to trespassers if they were
children.48 However, once a duty of ordinary care to all entrants was
required of property owners, trespassing children no longer required the
rule's special, although limited, protection.49 Rowland v. Christian
imposed a duty of care not limited by the requirements of the Restatement rule. A trespasser, regardless of whether a child or an adult, would
now be owed the same duty of care as any entrant onto an owner's land.
Because entrant classifications were now immaterial in determining
liability, it followed that the exceptions to the those classifications were
also immaterial. 50 Section 1714 provided a more favorable duty of care
to all entrants, and so the limited protection afforded by the Restatement
rule for trespassing children was no longer necessary.s 1
Although Rowland v. Christian abolished the traditional entrant
classifications of trespasser, licensee, and invitee, the decision had little

44. CAL. Civ. CODE§ 1714 (West 1985). Subsection (a) states:
Every one is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for
an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the
management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully
or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself.
45. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
46. CAL. CIV. CODE§ 1714 (West 1985).
47. Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d at 112, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
48. See supra note 37 for the text of RESTATEMENT § 339.
49. Smith v. Americania Motor Lodge, 39 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7, 113 Cal. Rptr. 771,
774 (1974); Beard v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 4 Cal. App. 3d 129, 135-36, 84 Cal.
Rptr. 449, 454 (1970). Compare RESTATEMENT§ 339, supra note 37 (text of attractive
nuisance doctrine) with CAL. Crv. CODE § 1714, supra note 44 (ordinary care
requirement).
50. Beard, 4 Cal. App. 3d at 136, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
51. Id.
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effect on the recreational use statute. Prior to Rowland, section 846 was
said to remove the legal classification of invitee or licensee (and the
corresponding duty owed) from anyone permitted to enter an owner's
property for fishing, hunting, camping, or other recreational uses. 52
The duty owed to such entrants was similar to the duty owed to a
trespasser prior to Rowland. Even after the traditional classifications
were no longer to be used in determining liability, if an entrant was
considered a recreational user under the terms of the statute, then a
different set of rules for determining liability would apply. The statutory
limitations on liability provided by section 846, as an exception to the
general duty of care required by section 1714, were not mentioned in
Rowland. Additionally, the scope of Rowland did not involve recreational uses, and furthermore, the court did not have the power to
invalidate that legislation unless it was in conflict with the California or
United States Constitutions. 53 The immunities granted to landowners
who opened their land for recreational uses continued to exist.
Rather than narrowing landowner immunities after Rowland, the
legislature broadened the scope of immunities granted by enacting a
series of amendments to section 846. In 1970, the legislature amended
section 846 to include riding among the enumerated activities. 54 In
1971, rock collecting was added55 and in 1972, riding was expanded to
include animal and all types of vehicular riding. 56 In 1976, spelunking
was added. 57 In 1978, the wording of the statute was changed so that
[a]n owner of any estate in real property owes no duty of care to keep the
premises safe for entry or use by others for any recreational purpose ....
A "recreational purpose," as used in this section, includes such activities as
fishing, hunting, camping, water sports, hiking, spelunking, riding, including
animal riding, snowmobiling, and all other types of vehicular riding, rock
collecting, sightseeing, picnicking, nature study, nature contacting, recreatienal
gardening, gleaning, winter sports, and viewing or enjoying historical,
archaeological, scenic, natural, or scientific sites. 58

52. 38 CAL. ST. B.J. 647 (1963).
53. English v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 66 Cal. App. 3d 725, 730-31, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 224, 227-28 (1977), disapproved on other grounds by Delta Farms Reclamation
Dist. No. 2028 v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699, 707, 660 P.2d 1168, 1173, 190 Cal.
Rptr. 494,499 (1983). See infra note 73 for a discussion of the effect of Delta Farms.
54. Act of Sept. 2, 1970, ch. 807, § 1, 1970 Cal. Stat. 1530.
55. Act of Oct. 13, 1971, ch. 1028, § 1, 1971 Cal. Stat. 1975.
56. Act of Dec. 11, 1972, ch. 1200, § 1, 1972 Cal. Stat. 2322.
57. Act of Sept. 28, 1976, ch. 1303, § 1, 1976 Cal. Stat. 5858-59.
58. Act of Apr. 6, 1978, ch. 86, § l, 1978 Cal. Stat. 221 (emphasis added).
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Sport parachuting was added to the list of included activities in 1979.59
In 1980, the legislature amended the landowner definition to include "an
owner of any estate or any other interest in real property, whether
possessory or nonpossessory."6 Finally, hang gliding was added to the
list of activities in 1988.61 None of the amendments includes a
statement of legislative intent, but it is apparent that the 1978 amendment marked a major move away from activities limited to those
normally conducted on park land to include such diverse activities as
recreational gardening and rock collecting, which have no association
with the increasing burden on state and national park land. The
legislature may have wanted to avoid artificially limiting the kinds of
recreational activities that would trigger immunity on land held open, or
it may have had a different intent. Until 1993 the courts continued,
however, to assume a legislative intent consistent with the legislative

°

59. Act of June 27, 1979, ch. 150, § l, 1979 Cal. Stat. 347.
60. Act of July 10, 1980, ch. 408, § 1, 1980 Cal. Stat. 797.
61. Act of June 1, 1988, ch. 129, § l, 1988 Cal. Stat. 507. The full text of the
current statute is:
An owner of any estate or any other interest in real property, .whether
possessory or nonpossessory, owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe
for entry or use by others for any recreational purpose or to give any warning
of hazardous conditions, uses of, structures, or activities on such premises to
persons entering for such purpose, except as provided in this section.
A "recreational purpose," as used in this section, includes such activities as
fishing, hunting, camping, water sports, hiking, spelunking, sport parachuting,
riding, including animal riding, snowmobiling, and all other types of vehicular
riding, rock collecting, sightseeing, picnicking, nature study, nature contacting,
recreational gardening, gleaning, hang gliding, winter sports, and viewing or
enjoying historical, archaeological, scenic, natural, or scientific sites.
An owner of any estate or any other interest in real property, whether
possessory or nonpossessory, who gives permission to another for entry or use
for the above purpose upon the premises does not thereby (a) extend any
assurance that the premises are safe for such purpose, or (b) constitute the
person to whom permission has been granted the legal status of an invitee or
licensee to whom a duty of care is owed, or (c) assume responsibility for or
incur liability for any injury to person or property caused by any act of such
person to whom permission has been granted except as provided in this
section.
This section does not limit the liability which otherwise exists (a) for willful
or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use,
structure or activity; or (b) for injury suffered in any case where permission
to enter for the above purpose was granted for a consideration other than the
consideration, if any, paid to said landowner by the state, or where consideration has been received from others for the same purpose; or (c) to any
persons who are expressly invited rather than merely permitted to come upon
the premises by the landowner.
Nothing in this section creates a duty of care or ground of liability for injury
to person or property.
CAL. Crv. CODE§ 846 (West Supp. 1995).

868

[VOL. 32: 857, 1995]

Recreational Use
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

intent articulated in other states' statutes and with the suggested state
legislation of 1965, that is, to encourage landowners to hold open their
property for recreational use without fear of liability for injury due to
that use. 62 However, the new language, absent a statement of legislative intent, opened the door for a wide variety of interpretations that
seemed to move away from the presumed original intent of the
legislature.
II.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF CALIFORNIA'S
RECREATIONAL USE STATUTE

Despite the work of the legislature in broadening the scope of the
recreational use statute between 1963 and 1978, little case law appeared
prior to 1977.63 In fact, although approximately one-third of the states
had enacted similar statutes prior to the appearance of the model

62. See, e.g., SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, supra note 14 (text of statement
of purpose). Many states have enacted specific statements of purpose as part of the
actual legislation. See, e.g., ALA. CODE§ 35-15-20 (1991); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-41-101 (West 1990); IDAHO CODE§ 36-1604(a) (1994); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 87.01
(West 1995). The Alabama legislature expressed an intent similar to many states,
stating:
It is hereby declared that there is a need for outdoor recreation areas in this
state which are open for public use and enjoyment; that the use and maintenance of these areas will provide beauty and openness for the benefit of the
public and also assist in preserving the health, safety, and welfare of the
population; that it is in the public interest to encourage owners of land to make
such areas available to the public for non-commercial recreational purposes by
limiting such owners' liability towards persons entering thereon for such
purposes; that such limitation on liability would encourage owners of land to
allow non-commercial public recreational use of land which would not
otherwise be open to the public, thereby reducing state expenditures needed to
provide such areas.
ALA. CODE § 35-15-20 (1991). See also John C. Becker, Landowner or Occupier
Liability for Personal Injuries and Recreational Use Statutes: How Effective is the
Protection?, 24 IND. L. REV. 1587 (1991) (discussing provisions of 1965 and 1979
suggested state legislation and application to specific circumstances); William C.
Knowles, Landowners' Liability Toward Recreational Users: A Critical Comment, 18
IDAHO L. REV. 59 (1982) (criticizing generality and wide application); Dean P. Laing,
Comment, Wisconsin's Recreational Use Statute: A Critical Analysis, 66 MARQ. L.
REV. 312 (1983) (comparing other states' intent to intent of Wisconsin Legislature);
Miller, supra note 13 (comparing application of state recreational use statutes).
63. See English v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 66 Cal. App. 3d 725, 136 Cal. Rptr.
224 (1977), disapproved on other grounds by Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. No. 2028
v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699, 707, 660 P.2d 1168, 1173, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494, 499
(1983). See infra note 73 for a discussion of the effect of Delta Farms.
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recreational use statute in 1965,64 and a majority had laws in place by
1972, little commentary or case law existed prior to 1976.65 Beginning
in 1977, the California courts began to deal with the question of the
constitutionality of section 846.66 However, in later years, the focus
shifted to the application of the statute to specific circumstances. As the
courts attempted to determine the meaning of such vague terms as
"recreational purpose" and "owner," they consistently drew upon the
presumed intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. Rather than
apply the statute literally to every situation that could come under the
heading of recreation, the courts selectively granted immunity to
landowners only when immunity would support the .purpose of the
statute - "to reduce the growing tendency of landowners to withdraw
land from recreational access by removing the risk of gratuitous tort
liability that a landowner might run unless he could successfully bar any
entry to his property for ... recreational use:" 67 As late as 1990, the
California Supreme Court acknowledged this goal when it utilized the
presumed statutory purpose of "constrain[ing] the growing tendency of
private landowners to bar public access to their land for recreational
uses" and "encourag[ing] property owners to allow the general public to
engage in recreational activities" to decide that a grazing interest in
federal property was a sufficient property interest to warrant the
immunity of section 846. 68 In 1993 the interpretation of the statute was

64. SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, supra note 11, at 150.
65. Laing, supra note 62, at 316.
66. See English, 66 Cal. App. 3d 725, 136 Cal. Rptr. 224; Lostritto v. Southern
Pac. Transp. Co., 73 Cal. App. 3d 737, 140 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1977).
67. English, 66 Cal. App. 3d at 731, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 228; see also Hubbard v.
Brown, 50 Cal. 3d 189, 192, 785 P.2d 1183, 1183, 266 Cal. Rptr. 491, 491-92 (1990);
Delta Fanns Reclamation Dist. No. 2028 v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699, 707-08, 660
P.2d 1168, 1173, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494, 499 (1983); Valladares v. Stone, 218 Cal. App. 3d
362, 367, 267 Cal. Rptr. 57, 59 (1990); Wineinger v. Bear Brand Ranch, 204 Cal. App.
3d 1003, 1008, 251 Cal. Rptr. 681,683 (1988); Domingue v. Presley ofS. Cal., 197 Cal.
App. 3d 1060, 1066, 243 Cal. Rptr. 312,315 (1988); Charpentier v. Von Geldem, 191
Cal. App. 3d 101, 108, 236 Cal. Rptr. 233, 236-37 (1987); Collins v. Tippett, 156 Cal.
App. 3d 1017, 1019-20, 203 Cal. Rptr. 366, 367 (1984); Potts v. Halsted Fin. Corp., 142
Cal. App. 3d 727, 730, 191 Cal. Rptr. 160, 161 (1983); Paige v. North Oaks Partners,
134 Cal. App. 3d 860, 863, 184 Cal. Rptr. 867, 868-69 (1982); Gerkin v. Santa Clara
Valley Water Dist., 95 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 1026, 157 Cal. Rptr. 612, 615 (1979); Smith
v. Scrap Disposal Corp., 96 Cal. App. 3d 525, 529, 158 Cal. Rptr. 134, 137 (1979).
68. Hubbard, 50 Cal. 3d at 193-94, 785 P.2d at 1184-85, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 492-93.
The court detennined that the legislative intent was to expand statutory immunity, even
if the interest holder could not exclude the public. Id. at 197,785 P.2d at 1187, 266
Cal. Rptr. at 495. Even though the actual owner of the land was a public entity, the
interest held by the defendant-a federal grazing pennit-was sufficient to invoke the
immunity of the statute. Id.
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expanded even further to apply to land that had already been withdrawn
from public use and was no longer suitable for public recreation. 69
A.

Validity of the Recreational Use Statute

The original text of the 1963 recreational use statute declared that
when a landowner gave permission to use private property for specific
recreational activities, the landowner was not giving the user the legal
entrant status of invitee or licensee. 70 In fact, as stated by the California State Bar Journal, the invitee or licensee status (and corresponding
duty owed) did not apply to anyone entering the landowner's property
for recreational use. 71 However, in 1968, in Rowland v. Christian, the
California Supreme Court abandoned the traditional entrant classifications and declared that a property owner owed a duty of ordinary care
to all entrants, regardless of classification. 72 The Rowland decision did ·
not mention the entrant status of a recreational user granted by
legislation. In 1977, the First District Court of Appeal addressed the
issue of whether the recreational user status and immunization from a
requirement of due care remained in effect even after Rowland v.
Christian. 73 The facts of English v. Marin Municipal Water District
clearly fall within the requirements for immunity under section 846 as
it existed at the time. A motorcyclist was riding for recreational
purposes on the defendant water district's land when he was injured
falling over a man-made precipice. 74 The plaintiff did not dispute the
applicability of the statute to the facts. He did, however, challenge the
continued validity of section 846, contending that after Rowland v.

69. Ornelas v. Randolph, 4 Cal. 4th 1095, 1112, 847 P.2d 560, 571, 17 Cal. Rptr.
2d 594, 605 (1993) (en bane) (Panelli, J., dissenting).
70. Act of July 17, 1963, ch. 1759, § 1, 1963 Cal. Stat. 3511-12.
71. 38 CAL. ST. B.J. 647, 647 (1963).
72. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108,443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
73. English v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 66 Cal. App. 3d 725, 136 Cal. Rptr. 224
(1977), disapproved on other grounds by Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. No. 2028 v.
Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699, 707, 660 P.2d 1168, 1173, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494, 499
(1983). The English court applied § 846 without addressing the fact that the property
involved was publicly owned. The California Supreme Court later disapproved the
holding of English (as well as Gerkin v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 95 Cal. App.
3d 1022, 157 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1979)) when it decided that§ 846 did not apply to public
property. Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. No. 2028 v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699,
707,660 P.2d 1168, 1173, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494,499 (1983).
74. English, 66 Cal. App. 3d at 727, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 225-26.
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Christian, landowners owed a duty of reasonable care, as described by
California Civil Code section 1714, to all entrants regardless of
classification. 75 The court determined that any exceptions to section
1714 must be based on legislative enactment or public policy, although
a legislative enactment such as section 846 is a statement of public
policy. 76 The court stated it did not have the power to invalidate
legislation unless it was determined to be unconstitutional. 77 In
addition, the court found that amendments· to section 846 after the
Rowland decision show a legislative policy to broaden the scope of
immunity granted by expanding the list of recreational uses so that
private land would continue to be available for public recreational
use. 78
Although the English court did not address the issue of constitutionality, this question was raised soon afterward in two appellate court
decisions, Lostritto v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.,79 decided
in 1977, and Parish v. Lloyd,80 decided in 1978. In 1977, when the
Lostritto case was decided, the recreational use statute listed specific
activities to which the statute applied. A property owner was immunized
only against entrants who came onto the property for fishing, hunting,
camping, water sports, hiking, spelunking, animal and vehicular riding,
rock collecting, and sightseeing. 81 The plaintiff in Lostritto, a sixteenyear-old minor, had entered the defendant's property to dive into the San
Lorenzo River from a railroad trestle that was owned by the defendant.
He broke his neck and became a quadriplegic when he dove into the
water, which was too shallow due to :fluctuating currents. 82 The court
determined that diving was a water sport, and that the plaintiff's
recreational purpose brought the case under section 846 and immunized
the property owner from a requirement of due care. 83 The plaintiff did
not object to this finding, but instead based his challenge on the
constitutionality of the statute. The 'plaintiff contended that the statute
denied equal protection on the basis ofunderinclusion, because it singled
out only certain types of recreation, and therefore limited classes of

75. Id. at 729, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 227. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1714(a) (enacted
1872), supra note 44.
76. English, 66 Cal. App. 3d at 730, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 731, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
79. 73 Cal. App. 3d 737, 140 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1977).
80. 82 Cal. App. 3d 785, 147 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1978).
81. Act of Sept. 28, 1976, ch. 1303, § 1, 1976 Cal. Stat. 5858-59.
82. Lostritto, 73 Cal. App. 3d at 743, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 907.
83. Id. at 747, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 909-10.
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persons who might recover damages. 84 The plaintiff also made a claim
of overinclusion, in that the immunity was granted unnecessarily to
property unsuitable for recreation and so did not support the purpose of
the legislation. 85 The basis of the constitutional challenge was that the
statute created unreasonable categories that violated equal protection and
did not further the goal of limiting the withdrawal of private land from
recreational use by the public. 86
The court responded to the challenge of underinclusion by stating that
the specified activities were "mostly the major ones which would be
undertaken by entrants to the property of another."87 The court stated
that the activities appeared to have been singled out by the legislature
because they are the activities in which accidents may be most likely to
occur, due to the large number of people who participate in those
activities and the large amount of area that is required to conduct such
activities. 88 In addition, the activities listed in the statute are the major
ones that would be supported by having private land available to ease
the burden on the demand for space in public areas. The simple fact
that the statute omitted some lesser sports did not support the plaintiff's
underinclusion argument. Accordingly, the court ruled that there was no
"offensive discrimination" in the statute because it provided limited
protection "for the benefit of landowner and visitor alike."89 In
addressing the challenge of overinclusion, the court stated that even
though the statute might grant immunity in some cases that did not
support the intent to discourage the withdrawal of private land, the
statutory classification did have a rational relationshit to a legitimate end
and so would not be considered unconstitutional.
In addition, the
statute was limited to the described activities, and the legislature may
have decided that it was unfair to hold. the landowner liable when the
property was used for those purposes. 91

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 747, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
at 749, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 911.
at 747, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
at 748, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
at 748, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 910-11.
at 749, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 911.
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A second constitutional challenge soon followed in 1978. In Parish
v. Lloyd,92 the plaintiff claimed that because the statute immunized
owners against recreational trespassers but required due care in the case
of nonrecreational trespassers, the classifications were arbitrary and
denied him equal protection. The court examined whether the classifications had a "rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose"93 and
decided that exempting owners from a due care requirement only for
recreational users furthered the goal of encouraging private owners to
allow the public to recreate by limiting exposure to tort liability. 94

B.

Application Based on Legislative Intent: The Suitability
Exception

Following the legislature's expansion of the recreational use statute in
1978 to include "any recreational purpose,"95 a series of decisions
focused on how to apply this potentially broad immunization to specific
cases where an uninvited entrant was injured on the landowner's
property. The recurring theme in the application of the statute was
whether immunization supported the intent of the legislature to
encourage recreational usage on private land in each instance.96
The First District Court of Appeal was the first appellate court to
decide whether to apply a broad, literal wording of the statute to a case
that might not otherwise come under section 846. A minor slipped and
fell while walking her bicycle across a bridge made of planks located on
the defendant's property. 97 The court held that this activity would not
be considered either hiking or riding, when the intent of the plaintiff was
not recreational in nature. The court stated that the statute "must be

92. 82 Cal. App. 3d 785, 147 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1978).
93. Id. at 787, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
94. Id. at 788, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
95. Act of Apr. 6, 1978, ch. 86, § 1, 1978 Cal. Stat. 221.
96. See, e.g., Valladares v. Stone, 218 Cal. App. 3d 362, 367, 267 Cal. Rptr. 57,
60 (1990); Wineinger v. Bear Brand Ranch, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1003, 1008, 251 Cal. Rptr.
681,685 (1988); Domingue v. Presley ofS. Cal., 197 Cal. App. 3d 1060, 1066, 243 Cal.
Rptr. 312,316 (1988); Charpentier v. Von Geldem, 191 Cal. App. 3d 101,108,236 Cal.
Rptr. 233, 237 (1987); Colvin v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 194 Cal. App. 3d 1306,
1313, 240 Cal. Rptr. 142, 146-47 (1987); Collins v. Tippett, 156 Cal. App. 3d 1017,
1019-20, 203 Cal. Rptr. 366, 368 (1984); Potts v. Halsted Fin. Corp., 142 Cal. App. 3d
727, 730, 191 Cal. Rptr. 160, 161 (1983); Paige v. North Oaks Partners, 134 Cal. App.
3d 860, 864, 184 Cal. Rptr. 867, 869 (1982); Smith v. Scrap Disposal Corp., 96 Cal.
App. 3d 525, 529, 158 Cal. Rptr. 134, 137 (1979).
97. Gerkin v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 95 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 1025, 157
Cal. Rptr. 612, 614 (1979), disapproved on other grounds by Delta Farms Reclamation
Dist. No. 2028 v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699, 707, 660 P.2d 1168, 1173, 190 Cal.
Rptr. 494,499 (1983). See supra note 73 for a discussion of the effect of Delta Farms.
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construed in light of the legislative purpose behind it"98 and that "a
purely literal interpretation of any part of a statute will not prevail over
the purpose of the legislation."99 This idea would form the basis for
a consistent line of decisions applying the statute until the Ornelas
decision in 1993.
After the legislature broadened the wording of section 846 in 1978 to
include any recreational purpose, the courts began to focus their attention
on whether the property in question should be granted immunity from
a due care requirement that would otherwise apply to nonrecreational
entrants. The first such question raised regarding the applicability of the
statute was decided by the Third District Court of Appeal in Nelson v.
City of Gridley. 100 When a motorcyclist was injured after striking a
cable stretched across a public street, the issue raised was whether the
immunity granted by the recreational use statute would apply to publicly
owned property. 101 The court based its decision that the statute did not
apply to public property on previous decisions regarding the constitutionality of the statute, where the immunity granted was related to the
legitimate goal of encouraging landowners to keep property open for
recreational purposes. 102 The court determined that immunity for
public property would not support the purpose of the legislature - to
encourage recreational usage. 1 3 Granting immunity to recreational
users of a public street would not encourage landowners to keep property
open for recreational use. In such a situation, there would be no rational
basis for the distinction between injuries to recreational users compared
to users of the street for other purposes. 104 This decision was approved by the California Supreme Court in Delta Farms v. Superior
Court. 105

98. Gerkin, 95 Cal. App. 3d at 1025, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
99. Id. at 1027, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
100. 113 Cal. App. 3d 87, 169 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1980).
101. Id. at 91, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 759.
102. Id.; see also Parish v. Lloyd, 82 Cal. App. 3d 785, 147 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1978);
Lostritto v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 73 Cal. App. 3d 737, 140 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1977);
discussion accompanying notes 79-94, supra.
103. Nelson, 113 Cal. App. 3d at 91, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 759.
104. Id.
105. See Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. No. 2028 v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d
699, 660 P.2d 1168, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1983); see also infra discussion accompanying
notes 167-71.
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The Nelson rationale was further supported by the Second District
Court of Appeal in a pair of decisions introducing a judicially created
exception to the recreational use statute. In 1982, the appellate court
decided that some types of property were not suitable for recreational
purposes. In Paige v. North Oaks Partners, 106 a ten-year-old boy was
riding his bicycle over an open trench while playing a game with some
friends at a construction site. The boy was injured when he fell into the
trench. 107 The court would not allow immunity for the construction
site owners even though the nature of the activity was recreational and
would come under the statute if interpreted literally. The court looked
to the purpose of the recreational use statute in deciding that "the
Legislature could not have intended to encourage owners and building
contractors to allow children to play on their temporary construction
projects." 108 This exception to the immunity granted by the recreational use statute was solidified in Potts v. Halsted Financial Corp., 109
which involved a similar injury to a minor at a construction site. The
court recognized that granting immunity in a situation where the
property was unsuitable for recreation and had, in fact, already been
withdrawn from recreational use by the public, would not support the
legislature's purpose of encouraging recreational access. 110
This suitability exception was utilized by the appellate courts for ten
years in an attempt to avoid results that presumably could not have been
intended by the legislature in enacting the statute. An owner of
electrical lines was granted immunity when a minor was injured by a
hanging guy wire even though the lines would not be considered suitable
for recreation. 111 The court's theory was that the statute still applied
because the property underneath the electrical wires was undeveloped
and open to anyone for such recreational purposes as riding and hiking.
The court believed this to be true even though the defendant electrical
company did not own the property-it only had permission to use the
land. 112 Immunity for this nonpossessory interest would be granted
under the 1980 amendment to the statute 113 and would support the
legislative purpose of keeping private property open for recreation. The

106. Paige v. North Oaks Partners, 134 Cal. App. 3d 860, 865, 184 Cal. Rptr. 867,
870 (1982).
107. Id. at 862, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
108. Id. at 863, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
109. 142 Cal. App. 3d 727, 191 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1983).
110. Id. at 730, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
111. Colvin v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 194 Cal. App. 3d 1306, 1314, 240 Cal.
Rptr. 142, 147 (1987).
112. Id.
113. Act of July 10, 1980, ch. 408, § 1, 1980 Cal. Stat. 797.
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court wished to avoid a situation where the owner who grants the
easement is protected by section 846 while the owner of a structure or
facility on the property is not protected. 114
In a case similar to the Paige and Potts decisions involving minors
trespassing on construction sites, the appellate court refused to grant
immunity to the owner of land that had been graded for future development when a minor was injured while bicycle riding. 115 Although the
property had previously been undeveloped pasture land, the defendant's
action of grading withdrew the land from recreational use. The court
recognized that when a developer begins work on land in preparation for
construction, the developer is using his private property for his own
purpose. Application of section 846, with its intent to keep private
property open for recreational use, would interfere with the developer's
use of his land. 116 The court noted that "section 846 may not be
construed without considering the intent of the Legislature in enacting
it" 117 and that a "'purely literal interpretation of any part of a statute
will not prevail over the purpose of the legislation. "' 118 The Third

114. Colvin, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 1314, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 147.
115. Domingue v. Presley ofS. Cal., 197 Cal. App. 3d 1060, 1070, 243 Cal. Rptr.
312, 318 (1988).
116. Id. at 1066, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 315-16; see also Wineinger v. Bear Brand Ranch,
204 Cal. App. 3d 1003, 251 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1988). The incident in Wineinger took
place in a residential housing tract that the defendant was developing. The streets in the
development were in the process of being graded and paved. One night, the plaintiff and
two friends drove on one of the streets in the development that had been paved, but was
still unlighted. Id. at 1006, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 682. The plaintiff was injured when the
vehicle drove over the edge of a 30-foot ravine where the road ended. Id. The court
determined that § 846 did not apply because the property had been withdrawn from
recreational use by the public, and, in fact, that "[f]ree recreational use by the public
during such development would interfere with that developer's purpose and use of its
private property and is consequently not encouraged." Id. at 1009, 251 Cal. Rptr. at
684-85. But see Smith v. Scrap Disposal Corp., 96 Cal. App. 3d 525, 158 Cal. Rptr. 134
(1979). In Smith, immunity under § 846 was available to the defendant based on the
right to bar ingress. The adult plaintiff had entered Scrap's property allegedly to ride
on a bulldozer. Without discussion of the owner's intentions for the property (whether
it was held open for or suitable for recreational use), the court held that whether the
statute would apply would be based on the plaintiff's intent in entering the property. Id.
at 529, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
117. Domingue, 197 Cal. App. 3d at 1067, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 316.
118. Id. at 1066, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 315 (quoting Gerkin v. Santa Clara Valley Water
Dist., 95 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 1027, 157 Cal. Rptr. 612,615 (1979), disapproved on other
grounds by Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. No. 2028 v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699,
707, 660 P.2d 1168, 1173, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494,499 (1983)). See also infra notes 121-22
and accompanying text.
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District Court of Appeal also raised the issue of withdrawal when it
determined that an undeveloped urban lot could be considered suitable
for recreation when the owner had done nothing to withdraw the land
from public recreational use. 119 Immunity would be granted to the
owner when children climbing trees on the lot were injured. 120
The appellate courts have used many accepted doctrines of judicial
interpretation in deciding recreational use cases. The statute began with
a list of specific activities in which immunity would be granted to the
landowner. Although the statute contained no explicit legislative
purpose, application was not difficult when the list of possible recreational uses was so exclusive. The legislature further clarified its
purpose by broadening the statute, at first through additional covered
activities and finally by including any recreational use, as defined by
(but not limited to) a list of recreational activities. 121 Primarily, the
appellate courts relied on legislative intent over a literal interpretation. 122 The courts have also been aided by the examples of recreational uses provided by the statute. If the legislature had meant to
immunize all owners from every recreational use of their property
regardless of the type of property or the kind of recreation, a list of
activities would be unnecessary. "[A] construction which implies that
words used by the legislature were superfluous is to be avoided wherever
possible." 123 Even after section 846 was broadened to include "any

119. Valladares v. Stone, 218 Cal. App. 3d 362, 370, 267 Cal. Rptr. 57, 62 (1990).
120. Id. at 371, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
121. Act of Apr. 6, 1978, ch. 86, § 1, 1978 Cal. Stat. 221. Prior to 1978, the courts
were faced with situations that involved the activities specified in the statute, but were
not recreational. An appellate court considered, but rejected, a literal interpretation of
the statute when it noted that, read .literally, the statute would immunize any property
owner from liability for the condition of his road when a person drove his car onto the
property. Gerkin v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 95 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 1027, 157
Cal. Rptr. 612, 616 (1979), disapproved on other grounds by Delta Farms Reclamation
Dist. No. 2028 v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699,707,660 P.2d 1168, 1173, 190 Cal.
Rptr. 494, 499 (1983). The court decided that the legislature's intent controlled,
meaning only to apply to recreational vehicle activity. Id.
122. See, e.g., Domingue v. Presley of S. Cal., 197 Cal. App. 3d 1060, 1067 n.2,
243 Cal. Rptr. 312, 316 n.2 (1988) (quoting Select Base Materials v. Board of
Equalization, 51 Cal. 2d 640, 645, 335 P.2d 672 (1959)) ("The most fundamental rule
of statutory construction is that 'the court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature
so as to effectuate the purpose of the law."'); Wineinger v. Bear Brand Ranch, 204 Cal.
App. 3d 1003, 1009, 251 Cal. Rptr. 681, 685 (1988) ("[The statute] may not be
construed without considering the intent of the Legislature in enacting it."); Potts v.
Halsted Fin. Corp., 142 Cal. App. 3d 727, 730, 191 Cal. Rptr. 160, 161 (1983) ("Statutes
must be given a reasonable interpretation and application in accordance with the purpose
and intention of the Legislature."); Gerkin, 95 Cal. App. 3d at 1027, 157 Cal. Rptr. at
615 ("A purely literal interpretation of any part of a statute will not prevail over the
purpose of the legislation.").
123. Gerkin, 95 Cal. App. 3d at 1027, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
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recreational purpose," the legislature continued to add to the list of
examples following those words. 124 Because the added list must be
interpreted to provide meaning to the term "recreational purpose,"
recreational purpose must include activities similar to those enumerated
in the statute. 125 Finally, the suitability exception was first applied by
the courts with the Paige v. North Oaks Partners decision in 1982. 126
For the next ten years, the courts continued to apply this exception to
limit the immunity provided by section 846. 127 During this period, the
legislature amended the statute to include hang gliding in the list of
enumerated activities. 128 It could reasonably be presumed that the
legislature, in discussing expansion of immunity, would have taken
action on a judicial interpretation limiting the immunity if it had
disagreed. In contrast, in 1980, the legislature took action after just two
1979 decisions denied immunity to holders of nonpossesory interests in
land. 129 The statute was amended to include any interest in land,
"whether possessory or nonpossessory." 130
In 1993, the California Supreme Court ended the judicial limitation
placed on the recreational use statute by the suitability exception.

124. See Act of June 27, 1979, ch. 150, § 1, 1979 Cal. Stat. 347; Act of July 10,
1980, ch. 408, § 1, 1980 Cal. Stat. 797.
125. E.g., Ornelas v. Randolph, 4 Cal. 4th 1095, 1114, 847 P.2d 560, 573, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 594,607 (1993) (en bane) (Panelli, J., dissenting); Valladares v. Stone, 218 Cal.
App. 3d 362, 369, 267 Cal. Rptr. 57, 60-61 (1990). The principle of ejusdem generis
provides that in listing specific examples following general words, the general words will
extend only to those similar in nature to the examples listed. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 517 (6th ed. 1990).
126. 134 Cal. App. 3d 860, 184 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1982).
127. See Valladares v. Stone, 218 Cal. App. 3d 362, 267 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1990)
(vacant lot in urban area with tree used for climbing was suitable for recreational use);
Domingue v. Presley of S. Cal., 197 Cal. App. 3d 1060, 243 Cal. Rptr. 312 (1988) (land
graded for development was withdrawn from public use and no longer suitable);
Wineinger v. Bear Brand Ranch, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1003, 251 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1988)
(residential tract being developed was withdrawn from public recreational use); Potts v.
Halsted Fin. Corp., 142 Cal. App. 3d 727, 191 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1983) (construction site
not suitable); Paige v. North Oaks Partners, 134 Cal. App. 3d 860, 184 Cal. Rptr. 867
(1982) (temporary construction project not suitable for recreation).
128. Act of June 1, 1988, ch. 129, § 1, 1988 Cal. Stat. 507.
129. See Darr v. Lone Star Indus., Inc., 94 Cal. App. 3d 895, 157 Cal Rptr. 90
( 1979) (owner of easement to cross American River who had built bridge was not owner
of estate in real property to which statute applied); O'Shea v. Claude C. Wood Co., 97
Cal. App. 3d 903, 159 Cal. Rptr. 125 (1979) (license allowing stockpiling of dirt was
not possessory interest; statute did not apply).
130. Act of July 10, 1980, ch. 408, § 1, 1980 Cal. Stat. 797.
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Ornelas v. Randolph 131 involved an eight-year-old child who trespassed
on property owned by a neighbor. Part of the property was made up of
an open area where old farm equipment, machinery, and irrigation pipes
were stored. Six children entered that area to climb and play on the
equipment, from which a metal pipe broke off and struck the plaintiff.132 The court found that the children's purpose in entering the land
was to play, and so their activity fell within the statute, based on its
phrase "any recreational purpose." The court acknowledged the
principle of ejusdem generis, however, it could find no characteristic
shared by the listed activities that would limit the meaning of "recreational purpose." 133 The first conclusion of the supreme court was that
"entering and using defendant's property to play on his farm equipment
invokes the immunity provisions of section 846" and that "clambering
about on farm equipment is no different in kind from scaling a cliff or
climbing a tree." 134 As the court stated, the child was taking "advantage of the recreational opportunities offered by the property." 135
The court then turned to analyze the history of the recreational use
statute, especially the prior judicial recognition of the suitability
exception. Section 846 contains only two statutory requirements: (1) an
injury must result from the use of private property for a recreational
purpose and (2) that injury must occur on land in which the owner has
a possessory or nonpossessory interest. The suitability exception was
developed by the courts to encourage owners to allow the public to use
their land for recreational purposes. If the property was not suitable for
recreation, then the goal in allowing immunity would not be served.
The Ornelas court declined to recognize this interpretation, noting that
the plain language of the statute provides no exceptions. 136 The court
held that a literal interpretation of the statute to include any private
property would not lead to the absurd results described by some of the
appellate court decisions. Because the statute was determined to be clear
and unambiguous, the court refused to allow a construction of the statute
that included a nonstatutory element. 137 Further, the court decided that
the intent of the legislature could reasonably have been to provide
immunity to any property owner when a trespasser is injured on that

131. 4 Cal. 4th 1095, 1098, 847 P.2d 560, 561, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594, 595 (1993)
(en bane).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1101, 847 P.2dat563, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597. See generally supra note
124 and accompanying text.
134. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1101, 847 P.2d at 564, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598.
135. Id. at 1102, 847 P.2d at 564, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598.
136. Id. at 1105, 847 P.2d at 566, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 600.
137. Id. at 1105-06 n.8, 847 P.2d at 567 n.8, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601 n.8.
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property (so long as the trespasser is "recreating"). 138 The determination of whether property was suitable for recreation was to be placed on
the user when the property was entered, and any potential injury would
be at the user's risk. 139
In discussing the suitability exception, the court found that all prior
applications of the exception involved construction sites, most with
injuries to minors. The Ornelas case appeared, however, to be the first
time the appellate courts had extended the exception beyond such
property. The supreme court majority noted that the land in this case
was not developed, was indisputably agricultural, and questioned whether
criteria for determining suitability could be found that would allow
consistent and certain application of the statute. 140 In addition, a
suitability exception would have the anomalous effect of denying
immunity to owners who had attempted to restrict trespassing. The court
determined that the statute "applies to lands that are fenced as readily as
those that are open." 141 For these reasons, suitability for recreation as
a criterion for immunity was rejected. Justice George, in a concurring
opinion, agreed with the majority opinion due to the language of section
846. He acknowledged the dissent's argument that a child injured while
trespassing on private property to play would be treated more severely
than an adult trespassing on the same property for illegal purposes, but
determined the same disparity would exist whether the property were
suitable for recreation or not. 142 Justice George concurred although the
result was "unfortunate," because he believed only the legislature could
rewrite the statute. 143

138. Id. at 1105, 847 P.2d at 567, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601.
139. Id. at 1106, 847 P.2d at 567, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601.
140. Id. at 1107, 847 P.2d at 567-68, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601.
141. Id. at 1107, 847 P.2d at 568, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602.
142. Id. at 1109, 847 P.2d at 569-70, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 603 (George, J.,
concurring). Justice George also dissented from the appellate court decision in
Domingue v. Presley of S. Cal., stating that the mere grading of part of 10 acres of
property did not make the land unsuitable for recreation. Domingue v. Presley of S.
Cal., 197 Cal. App. 3d 1060, 1079, 243 Cal. Rptr. 312, 324 (1988) (George, J.,
dissenting). Although his major argument appeared to be that the land was suitable for
recreation, he also stated that application of the suitability exception to the facts of the
case was not supported by the language of the statute or by precedent and was best left
to legislative amendment. Id.
143. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1110, 847 P.2d at 570, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 604.
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The three dissenting justices 144 believed that the legislature had
acquiesced to the suitability exception over a ten-year period that
included legislative amendments to section 846. 145 The immunity
allowed by the recreational use statute, an exception to the ordinary duty
of care owed to all entrants, is granted only after the trade-off of a gain
in open, recreational areas. Without the suitability exception, immunity
is granted in certain categories of accidents without supporting the
legitimate state purpose of encouraging increased recreational areas. 146
Justice Panelli noted that "[t]he majority's interpretation of section 846
permits the exception created by that section to swallow the general duty
of care in practically all nonbusiness contexts." 147 The Ornelas
decision therefore appears to resurrect the traditional common-law
categories of entrants and their corresponding no-duty rules abolished by
the same court in Rowland v. Christian in 1968. 148
III.

THE CURRENT STATUS OF TRESPASSING CHILDREN IN
CALIFORNIA

When California's recreational use statute was first enacted, the
traditional common-law entrant classifications of invitee, licensee, and
trespasser determined the duty of care required by any landowner. 149
Section 846 was geared toward these classifications, stating that granting
permission to use a property for recreational purposes did not convey
"the legal status of an invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is
owed." 150 An exception to the no-duty rule for trespassers had,
however, been accepted by the California Supreme Court since 1891 151
and had long been a part of the standard of care that landowners owed
trespassers in California. 152 Although the earlier cases strictly held the

144. Justices Panelli, Mosk, and Kennard.
145. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at llll, 847 P.2d at 570-71, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 604-05
(Panelli, J., dissenting); see also text accompanying notes 126-30.
146. Ornelas, 4 Cal. 4th at 1112, 847 P.2d at 571, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 605.
147. Id.
148. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1968); see also supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
149. See WITKIN, supra note 21, § 912.
150. Act of July 17, 1963, ch. 1759, § 1, 1963 Cal. Stat. 3511.
151. See Barrett v. Southern Pac. Co., 91 Cal. 296, 27 P. 666 (1891). For an
explanation of the Barrett case, see supra note 39.
152. See, e.g., Courtell v. McEachen, 51 Cal. 2d 448, 334 P.2d 870 (1959); Garcia
v. Soogian, 52 Cal. 2d 107, 338 P.2d 433 (1959); King v. Lennen, 53 Cal. 2d 340, 348
P.2d 98, 1 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1959); Reynolds v. Willson, 51 Cal. 2d 94, 331 P.2d 48
(1958); Knight v. Kaiser Co., 48 Cal. 2d 778,312 P.2d 1089 (1957); Cahill v. E.B. &
A.L. Stone & Co., 153 Cal. 571, 96 P. 84 (1908); Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 345, 47
P. 113 (1896); Helguera v. Cirone, 178 Cal. App. 2d 232, 3 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1960); Davis
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liability requirements of the attractive nuisance doctrine to its elements,
the California Supreme Court began expanding application of the rule
around the same time as the recreational use statute was enacted. In
1957, the California Supreme Court decided Knight v. Kaiser Co., 153
in which a sandpile was ruled not to constitute an attractive nuisance due
to its common occurrence. Interestingly, in a dissenting opinion, Justice
Traynor foreshadowed the change in entrant liability rules that would
follow in the 1968 decision of Rowland v. Christian. Traynor disagreed
that the sandpile, as a matter of law, did not constitute an attractive
nuisance. 154 He based his dissent on the facts of the case, stating that
not all children would have been aware of the dangers presented by an
industrial sandpile. He felt that each case should be decided on its
specific circumstances, rather than creating a blanket ''sandpile rule." 155
All of the other requirements for application of the attractive nuisance
doctrine were present--children were accustomed to playing on the
sandpile, the defendant knew or should have known of their presence,
the children were unable to realize the risk due to their age, reasonable
protections were not taken, and the protections were not so burdensome
as to interfere with the use of the site. Traynor objected to the
majority's reliance on the categorizations of hazards as nuisances or
common conditions in determining the required standard of care toward
children. In quoting the Illinois Supreme Court, he stated that "'[t]he
naming or labeling of a certain set of facts as being an "attractive
nuisance' case or a 'turntable' case has often led to undesirable
conclusions. . . . [T]he only proper basis for decision in such cases
dealing with personal injuries to children are the customary rules of
ordinary negligence cases. "' 156

v. Goodrich, 171 Cal. App. 2d 92,340 P.2d 48 (1959); Wilford v. Little, 144 Cal. App.
2d 477, 301 P.2d 282 (1956); Huggans v. Southern Pac. Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d 599, 207
P.2d 864 (1949).
153. 48 Cal. 2d 778, 312 P.2d 1089 (1957). In Knight, the defendant owned and
maintained a large unenclosed industrial sandpile on which children were in the habit
of playing. The court found that all the requirements for application of the attractive
nuisance doctrine were met, however, an exception was made for common conditions
whose danger was obvious even to children. Id. at 784, 312 P.2d at 1093.
154. Id. at 789, 312 P.2d at 1096 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 792,312 P.2d at 1098 (quoting Kahn v. James Burton Co., 126 N.E.2d
836, 841 (Ill. 1955)). Traynor also recognized the possibility of extending Civil Code
§ 1714 to all trespasser cases; however, he stated the "dilemma of choosing between
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The courts appeared to follow Traynor's reasoning, expanding the
protection available to trespassing children in the following years. In
1959, the California Supreme Court was faced with another case decided
by the lower court for the plaintiff based on section 339 of the
Restatement of Torts. Although the supreme court reversed the lower
court's decision, it stated that "liability must be decided in the light of
all the circumstances and not by arbitrarily placing cases in rigid
categories." 157 Also in 1959, the California Supreme Court decided
King v. Lennen, 158 in which the court repeated that each case must be
decided on its own facts, expressly disapproving Knight v. Kaiser and
other cases that had effectively established no-duty rules for children
trespassing in certain circumstances. 159 As the First District Court of
Appeal noted in 1960, the requirements of the attractive nuisance
doctrine were being interpreted broadly in considering whether specific
facts regarding trespassing children stated a cause of action. The
decision would be up to the jury to decide liability based on whether the
requirements were met. 160
During this period of expanding protection for children, the legislature
enacted the recreational use statute. Although the statute did not
specifically provide an exception for children using private land for
recreation, the legislature may have decided· that an exception in the
nature of the attractive nuisance doctrine was not necessary, due to the
limited activities to which the statute applied. In addition, because the
entrant was labeled a trespasser (and the landowner thus had no duty of
care), it is possible that the attractive nuisance doctrine would have

[adult trespasser] cases and the rule set forth in section 1714 is not now before us." Id.
at 785-86, 312 P.2d at 1094 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
157. Garcia v. Soogian, 52 Cal. 2d 107, 110, 338 P.2d 433, 435 (1959). The
plaintiff was injured while playing on defendant's stacked, prefabricated panels
containing windows. While holding that the 12-year-old plaintiff should have been·
aware of the danger, the court also stated that the commonness of a condition had no
significance apart from the obviousness of the risk. Id. at 111, 338 P.2d at 435.
158. 53 Cal. 2d 340, 348 P.2d 98, 1 Cal. Rptr. 665 {1959).
159. Id. at 344-45, 348 P.2d at 100, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 667 (disapproving Knight v.
Kaiser Co., 48 Cal. 2d 778,312 P.2d 1089 (1957); Melendez v. City of Los Angeles,
8 Cal. 2d 741, 68 P.2d 971 (1937); Doyle v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 6 Cal. 2d 550, 59
P.2d 93 (1936); Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 345, 47 P. 113 (1896); Van Winkle v. City
of King; 149 Cal. App. 2d 500,308 P.2d 512 (1957); Wilford v. Little, 144 Cal. App.
2d 477, 301 P.2d 282 (1956); Lopez v. Capitol Co., 141 Cal. App. 2d 60, 296 P.2d 63
(1956); Lake v. Ferrer, 139 Cal. App. 2d 114,293 P.2d 104 (1956); Ward v. Oakley Co.,
125 Cal. App. 2d 840, 271 P.2d 536 (1954); King v. Simons Brick Co., 52 Cal. App.
2d 586, 126 P.2d 627 (1942); Beeson v. City of Los Angeles, 115 Cal. App. 122; 300
P. 993 (1931); Reardon v. Spring Valley Water Co., 68 Cal. App. 13, 228 P. 406
(1924)).
160. Helguera v. Cirone, 178 Cal. App. 2d 232,237, 3 Cal. Rptr. 64, 67 (1960).
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provided an exception that required a higher standard of care to children
if the property contained a hazardous condition..
An indication that providing protection to children was very much a
concern of the legislature is seen in the California Tort Claims Act, 161
which was enacted in the same year as the recreational use statute. The
Tort Claims Act addresses liability of public entities who open their
property to recreational users. Section 831.2 of the California Government Code provides blanket immunity for injuries caused by natural
conditions of unimproved public property, 162 and section 831.4 provides immunity when certain unpaved public roads are used to provide
access to "fishing, hunting, camping, hiking, riding ... , water sports,
recreational or scenic areas." 163 However, section 831.8, which
discusses liability for injuries caused by the condition of a reservoir,
provides an exception for children under age twelve. Section 831.8(d)
states:
Nothing in this section exonerates a public entity or a public employee from
liability for injury proximately caused by a dangerous condition of property if:
(1) The person injured was less than 12 years of age;
(2) The dangerous condition created a substantial and unreasonable risk of
death or serious bodily harm to children under 12 years of age using the
property or adjacent property with due care in a manner in which it was
reasonably foreseeable that it would be used;
(3) The person injured, because of his immaturity, did not discover the
condition or did not appreciate its dangerous character; and
(4) The public entity or the public employee had actual knowledge of the
condition and knew or should have known of its dangerous character a
sufficient timeprior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against
the condition. 1

The comparison to the Restatement of Torts rule for trespassing
children is clear. 165 However, due to the fact that the property affected
by the Tort Claims Act is public, entrant classifications such as
trespasser (and the accompanying trespassing child exception) would not
apply. A separate section would be required to provide a higher duty of
care toward children, and that is exactly what the legislature enacted. In
discussing section 831.8(d), the legislature noted the comparison to the
161. CAL. GOV'T CODE§ 831 (West 1980).
162. CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 831.2 (West 1980).
163. CAL. GOV'T CODE§ 831.4 (West 1980).
164. CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 831.8(d) (West 1980).
165. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 37, for requirements of the attractive nuisance
doctrine.
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attractive nuisance doctrine, stating that "[p]rivate landowners are subject
to liability under the same circumstances without regard to age of the
injured child under the so-called 'attractive nuisance' doctrine." 166 It
is apparent that the legislature felt the doctrine would provide sufficient
protection for trespassing children in dangerous circumstances, even if
the use was recreational.
In a comparison of section 846 and the Tort Claims Act, the California
Supreme Court noted these differences when they decided that section
846 applied only to private property. 167 The court com.pared the
history of both statutes and noted that they were enacted two days apart,
were considered concurrently by the same committees, and contained
similar language and purpose. 168 Additionally, subsequent amendments
to both sections were passed as a single bill, and both sections have
similar revisions regarding recreational use. 169 The court in Delta
Farms com.pared the two statutes in order to support a holding that
section 846 applied only to private lands because the Tort Claims Act
was directed solely toward publicly owned lands. 170 The comparison
was made to show that the legislature was aware of the differences in
the provisions of each statute and would not have intended the requirements of one to overlap and even contradict the other. 171 However,
this argument also supports the presumption that the legislature· had in

166. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 831.8 cmt. (West 1980).
167. Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. No. 2028 v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 699,
709, 660 P.2d 1168, 1175, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494, 501 (1983). Two 15-year-old girls
drowned in the defendant's canal. The relatives.of the victims claimed that the canal
was a dangerous condition in that it dropped unexpectedly to a depth of 60 feet five feet
from shore. They also claimed that the defendant was negligent in knowing of the
condition, knowing that visitors frequented the area, and failing to provide proper
protection. The defendant claimed immunity under both§§ 831.8 and 846. Id. at 70204, 660 P.2d at 1169-70, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 495-96. The court declined to find immunity
under either section. Id. at 704, 710, 660 P.2d at 1170, 1175, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 496, 501.
168. Id. at 705, 660 P.2d at 1111-72, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 497-98.
169. Nelsen v. City of Gridley, 113 Cal. App. 3d 87, 94, 169 Cal. Rptr. 757, 761
(1980).
170. Delta Farms, 33 Cal. 3d at 710,660 P.2d at 1175, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
171. Id. The immunity provided by §§ 831.2 and 831.4 are similar to the
recreational use statute in providing immunity for the natural condition of unimproved
public property and unpaved roads and trails that provide access to certain recreational
activities. However, § 831.4 provides a more limited immunity if the road leading to
the recreational area is paved or is an unpaved city street. Section 831.8 immunizes
public entities from the dangerous conditions of reservoirs when used for purposes for
which they were not intended. However, § 831.8 also includes certain exceptions. The
immunity is negated if the user is injured by a trap known to the owner, if the entrant
is not guilty of criminal trespass. CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 831.8(c) (West 1980). Immunity
is also not applicable when the plaintiff is less than 12 years old, and requirements
similar to the attractive nuisance doctrine are met. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 831.8(d)
(West 1980).
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mind the desire to protect young children who cannot be expected to
watch out for themselves (as shown by the inclusion of an exception for
trespassing children in the Tort Claims Act) and was equally aware that
additional language in the recreational use statute was not required.
The requirements for protection of young children (as well as all
entrants) was further expanded with the California Supreme Court's
decision in Rowland v. Christian. 172 The removal of the traditional
entrant classifications defining duties of care also necessarily removed
the exceptions to those duties of care. The recreational use statute,
however, remained an exception to the general duty of care required, still
reducing the level of care toward a recreational entrant to what was
previously the level of care required toward a trespasser. The anomaly
created is that by removing an exception to limited duties of care
(trespassing children) because there were no longer such limited duties
of care, a potential exception to the recreational use statute's limited
duty of care was also removed. This may not have been as important
in 1968 when Rowland was decided, due to the limited applicability of
the recreational use statute, but with the California Supreme Court's
recent holding in Ornelas and the expanded application of the recreational use statute, this omission becomes critical.
The Ornelas decision grants immunity to private landowners whenever
an entrant has entered the property for any recreational purpose. Despite
the decision's opening words focusing on the state's scenic treasures of
shoreline, mountains, lakes, and deserts that contribute to the desire of
the public to recreate and the demand for areas in which to do so, and
despite the recognized intent of the legislature to encourage property
owners to keep their land open to the public to help meet that demand,
the court has extended immunity to any recreational purpose and to any
private land. The court's determination that the user determines, by his
mere use, what land is suitable for recreation and therefore relieves the
owner of liability for injury from that use, may in fact be in line with
other recent trends showing a desire to relieve landowners of a duty of
care toward trespassers. 173 The court's rationale could be justified

172. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1968); see also supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Mall, 6 Cal. 4th 666, 863 P.2d
207, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 137 (1993); Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal. 3d 112,
695 P.2d 653,211 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1985); Nola M. v. University of S. Cal., 16 Cal. App.
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when the .user is able to make a determination of the risks involved in
the use of a particular property, as is the case with adults. However, it
ignores a long line of cases supporting the policy that children, who are
unable to make realistic decisions, deserve special consideration. 174
The injured plaintiff in the Ornelas decision was· eight years old. The
trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant based on the
recreational use statute, and the court of appeal reversed, but the state
supreme court reversed the appellate court's decision. 175 The supreme
court appears to have decided, as a matter of law, that an eight-year-old
child is responsible for the determination as to whether a place that
appears to the child to be a good place to play (including a place
housing old, stored, farm machinery) is actually suitable for play.
Authorities acknowledge the purpose behind the implementation of the
attractive nuisance doctrine as a desire to provide additional protection
to children who were unable to protect themselves. 176 As far back as
1891, the California Supreme Court recognized that children were less
able to provide for their own protection. 177 In considering section 339
of the Restatement of Torts, the court stated that
children of tender years are guided in their actions by childish instincts, and are
lacking in that discretion which is ordinarily sufficient to enable those of more
mature years to appreciate and avoid danger, and in proportion to this lack of
judgment on their part, the care which must be observed towards them by others
is increased. 178

Even in determining an ordinary duty of care, aside from any exceptions
to the limited duty rules, it has been widely recognized that the duty of
care is higher in a situation involving potential danger to children, due

4th 421, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97 ( 1993 ); see also supra notes 185-90 and accompanying text;
Irwin E. Sandler, Premises Liability in California; The Courts are Increasingly
Protective of the Rights of Landowners, Los ANGELES LAw., Jan. 1993, at 38
(discussing current trends in a variety of premises situations); David M. Ring, Premises

Immunity? Courts Erect Daunting Barriers to Negligence Suits by Victims of Crime,
Los ANGELES DAILY J., Jan. 10, 1994, at 6 (discussing the state of business premises
liability after the Ann M and Nola M decisions).
174. See supra discussion accompanying notes 149-60.
175. Ornelas v. Randolph, 4 Cal. 4th 1095, 847 P.2d 560, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594
(1993) (en bane). .
176. KEETON ET AL., supra note 22, § 59, at 399; Prosser, supra note 1, at 429.
177. See Barrett v. Southern Pac.• Co., 91 Cal. 296, 27 P. 666 (1891).
178. Id. at 302-03, 27 P. at 667; see also Copfer v. Golden, 135 Cal. App. 2d 623,
627, 288 P.2d 90, 93 (1955) ("Children of tender years have no foresight and scarcely
any apprehensiveness of danger ...."); Huggans v. Southern Pac. Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d
599,611,207 P.2d 864, 871 (1949) ("[T]he plaintiff was obviously a child and ... the
quantum of care to be exercised toward children, from whom is to be expected the
natural heedlessness of youth, is always greater than that required to be exercised toward
adult persons.").
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to their inability to understand risk. 179 Even after Rowland v. Christian raised the duty of care required toward all entrants, the courts
recognized that a landowner owed a duty of care even higher than the
Rowland standard when dealing with dangers to children. 180
It would appear that after the California Supreme Court decided
Rowland v. Christian the policy of protecting the state's children was
advanced to a new level: the specific limitations on liability under the
attractive nuisance doctrine were removed, while it continued to be
recognized that children, who are unable to take care for themselves in
all situations, deserve an extra duty of care from individuals responsible
for the situation. However, the Ornelas decision has effectively reduced
the duty of care required toward children on private land to a level
below that which was required by the attractive nuisance doctrine. The
Ornelas decision purports to apply only when an individual, who is not
expressly invited, enters private land for recreational purposes. The
179. See 57 A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 205 (1989); 1 COMMITTEE ON STANDARD
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL 66 (Charles A.
Loring ed., 7th ed. 1986). In California, the jury instruction for the standard of care
required toward children is as follows:
Ordinarily it is necessary to exercise greater caution for the protection and
safety of a young child than for an adult person who possesses normal physical
and mental faculties. One dealing with children must anticipate the ordinary
behavior of children. The fact that they usually do not exercise the same
degree of prudence for their own safety as adults, that they often are
thoughtless and impulsive, imposes a duty to exercise a proportional vigilance
and caution on those dealing with children, and from whose conduct injury to
a child might result.
Id. The fourth edition of approved jury instructions included an instruction regarding
the attractive nuisance doctrine, but the instruction was deleted after Rowland v.
Christian imposed an ordinary duty of care in all circumstances. However, a general
instruction regarding the higher duty of care required toward children remained. See 2
CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL 664-65 (William J. Palmer ed., 4th ed. 1956).
See also Edward Meany, Standard o/Care Involving Children, 72 MICH. B.J. 574 (1993)
(reviewing the standard of care applied in courts toward children).
180. E.g., McDaniel v. Sunset Manor Co., 220 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7, 269 Cal. Rptr.
196, 199 (1990). In McDaniel, a two-year-old child slipped through a gap in the fence
at the housing project where she lived. She then slipped into a creek that bordered the
fence and suffered brain damage and quadriplegia. Id. at 4, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 197. The
project owners were found negligent in failing to maintain the fence when it was
foreseeable that injuries to children could occur due to gaps in the fence. Id. at 10, 269
Cal. Rptr. at 201. In discussing the landowner's duty of care toward children; the court
stated: "A landowner similarly shares that duty to 'protect the young and heedless from
themselves and guard them against perils that reasonably could have been foreseen."'
Id. at 7, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 199 (quoting Copfer v. Golden, 135 Cal. App. 2d 623, 629,
288 P.2d 90, 93-94 (1955)).
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court's broad interpretation ofrecreation appears, however, to encompass
any activity that might be considered play by a child. The situations in
which a landowner would owe an ordinary duty of care to a child
entering private property to play are limited to:
(a) willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition,
use, structure or activity; or (b) for injury suffered in any case where permission
to enter for the above purpose was granted for consideration ... ; or (c) to any
persons who are expressly invited rather than merely permitted to come upon
the premises by the landowner. 181

It currently appears that if a child suggests to a friend that they go and

play in the friend's back yard, the parents of the friend would be
immune from liability for any injury to the child due to the condition of
the back yard. A duty of care would not be owed to this child
regardless of how foreseeable it was that the children would play there,
and regardless of how dangerous it might be in the back yard, because
the child was not "expressly invited." Even in cases where a child is
expressly invited, the child should not be expected to know that the
property can be assumed to be safe only in those specific instances when
the child is expressly invited. For example, if a child is expressly
invited to play in a neighbor's back yard on a swing set, the neighbor
owes a duty of due care to assure that the premises are safe. One could
imagine, however, a situation in which the swing set breaks, but the
neighbor leaves it in a hazardous condition while he goes away on
vacation. The child, unaware of the condition of the swing set, enters
the neighbor's property during that time and is severely injured when the
swing set collapses on top of him or her. Was the child expressly
invited onto the property that particular time? If so, the landowner
would have been under a duty to keep the premises safe. If not, the
landowner would have no duty. It seems a bit much to expect a young
child to be able to know the difference.
The extension of the statute beyond the suitability requirement to any
private property means that any time a child wanders onto private
property to play, the owner of that property is absolved of any negligence regarding the condition and safety of his land. This seems to
create a special class of individuals to whom no duty of care is required
in the maintenance of one's property-the trespassing child. Although
adults may enter another's property for a variety of reasons, including
travel shortcuts, curiosity, recreation, and even illegal activities, the
landowner would be immunized from liability for the condition of the
property only for recreation. Adults who use another's property for

181.
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recreational purposes usually have planned intentions and may be
expected to be aware of and accountable for any risks they may
encounter. In contrast, it would be very easy to extend the landowner's
immunity to many situations involving child trespassers other than
preplanned recreational uses, knowing the propensity of children to stop
and play. A child's business is play and is likely to occur during any
other activity. The courts have recognized that children have a
propensity to intermeddle and that a trespassing child's "activities
usually are recreational." 182
The court's decision in Ornelas may reflect a general dissatisfaction
with the duty of care required by a landowner toward a trespasser that
was established after Rowland. As noted by Prosser and Keeton, the
movement toward abolition of entrant classifications lost momentum in
the 1970s and in 1979 "came to a screeching halt." 183 They noted as
a possible explanation that it "appears that the courts are gaining a
renewed appreciation for the considerations behind the traditional duty
limitations toward trespassing adults." 184 Similar trends also appear in
a number of recent California decisions involving duty of care.
Although Becker v. /RM Corp. 185 established strict liability for the
landlords of defective premises, the courts of appeal declined to extend
this holding in Muro v. Superior Court186 and Hahn v. Superior
Court, 187 both determining •that such strict liability did not apply to

182. Paige v. North Oaks Partners, 134 Cal. App. 3d 860, 864, 184 Cal. Rptr. 867,
869 (1982); see also Copfer v. Golden, 135 Cal. App. 2d 623, 628, 288 P.2d 90, 93
(1955) ("childish propensities to intermeddle"); Crane v. Smith, 23 Cal. 2d 288,297, 144
P. 356, 361 (1944) ("Known characteristics of children, including their childish
propensities to intermeddle, must be taken into consideration ....").
183. KEETON, supra note 22, § 62, at 433.
184. Id. at 434.
185. 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985). In Becker v. IRM
Corp., the plaintiff asserted causes of action for both negligence and strict liability when
he slipped and fell against a glass shower door in an apartment he had leased from the
defendant. Id. at 457,698 P.2d at 117,213 Cal. Rptr. at 214. The court compared the
activity of the landlord to that of a lessor of products (to whom strict liability would
apply), holding that the landlord was strictly liable for injuries resulting from a latent
defect that existed when the apartment was initially leased to the tenant. Id. at 465, 698
P.2d at 122, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
186. 184 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 229 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1986) (where employee of
commercial tenant injured on premises, Becker rationale involving landlord-tenant
relationship would not apply).
187. 1 Cal. App. 4th 1448, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 502 (1992). In Hahn, the plaintiff was
injured by a tree that fell while he ate lunch in an outdoor courtyard of a commercial
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commercial premises. In addition, in Ann M v. Paci.fie Plaza Shopping
Mall, 188 the court overturned a prior ruling which held that foreseeability in determining negligence could be determined without showing prior
incidents. 189 Now, a finding of negligence by a landowner in failing
to provide proper security precautions can only be shown by a high
degree of foreseeability, which can rarely be proven in absence of prior
similar incidents on the landowner's premises. 190 It seems clear that
the trend of the California Supreme Court is to limit a landowner's
liability. 191 Placing the burden of responsibility for any injury on the
user must, however, be accompanied by the user's ability to accept
responsibility for that injury. This ability is lacking in children who
have yet to develop knowledge and experience of risks that may
accompany their desire to play.
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Ideally, a clarification of the intent of the legislature in the current
application of the recreational use statute is needed. The amendments
to the statute over the years have allowed the courts to go beyond the
original intent to encourage landowners to keep their private property
open for recreational use by the public. In looking at the current
application of the statute it appears that the policy has shifted to a desire
to immunize landowners in all instances where their property is used for

shopping center. Id. at 1450, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 502-03. The court refused to extend the
rationale of Becker, which gave protection to a residential tenant, to commercial
premises liability. Id. at 1452, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 504.
188. 6 Cal. 4th 666, 863 P.2d 207, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 137 (1993). An employee of
a tenant of a shopping center owner brought a suit for negligence against the owner
when she was raped on the premises. Id. at 670, 863 P.2d at 209, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
139. The court held that a requirement of providing security guards could not be
imposed without a high degree of foreseeability that would rarely be found without prior
similar incidents occurring on the premises. Id. at 679, 863 P.2d at 216, 25 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 145.
189. See Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 38 Cal. 3d 112, 695 P.2d 653, 211
Cal. Rptr. 356 (1985). When a doctor was assaulted in a hospital parking lot, the court
allowed the plaintiff to establish foreseeability without evidence of prior similar
incidents. Factors such as location of the hospital, other criminal activity in the area,
inadequate lighting, and absence of security could all be used to demonstrate that the
attack was foreseeable and that the defendant was negligent in not providing adequate
protection. Id. at 130, 695 P.2d at 661-62, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 364-65. The test
announced for foreseeability was the totality of circumstances, allowing the case to go
to the jury even without prior similar incidents. Id. at 126-27, 695 P.2d at 659, 211 Cal.
Rptr. at 362.
190. Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Mall, 6 Cal. 4th 666, 863 P.2d 207, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 137 (1993).
191. For a review of the recent trends in premises immunity cases, see Ring, supra
note 173; Sandler, supra note 173.
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recreation. The legislature should look carefully at the ramifications of
this policy as it applies to the possible negligent maintenance of
dangerous situations. It appears that construction site owners are no
longer required to keep their sites safe from children who enter to play
and that private property owners may keep hazardous conditions on their
property, as long as it is only playing children who are exposed to the
danger.
Statutory exceptions for children are already part of the Tort Claims
Act. The legislature specifically included an exception for immunity
under section 831.8 of that Act. This part of the Tort Claims Act
applies to reservoirs, which are the only public property addressed in the
Act likely to contain dangers to children that could reasonably be
controlled and limited by human intervention. The statute does not limit
governmental liability in this case if the person injured is under twelve
years of age. The other sections, which deal with unimproved public
property and unpaved public roads, are far less likely to contain
dangerous conditions that are as easily controlled or limited. The
legislature obviously felt it important to protect young children when it
was possible to do so.
Similar protections could be adopted for children trespassing on
private land where dangerous conditions exist. A specific statutory
exception was not necessary when· the recreational use statute was
adopted. Both the limited activities included under the statute and the
existence of protection for trespassing children under the attractive
nuisance doctrine provided adequate protection for children. However,
this is no longer the case. Due to the way the law has developed, a
specific exception for young children is necessary, just as it was
necessary in the Tort Claims Act. The legislature should add a section
to the recreational use statute along the lines of section 831.8(d) of the
Tort Claims Act. This would replace the protection originally provided
by the attractive nuisance doctrine and bring the duty of care owed to
children in line with that of the Tort Claims Act. Children who are
unable to reasonably make the determination that a property is suitable
for play need to be protected by those who are in control of the property
and reasonably able to provide safety, when that owner is aware that
children may be there.
Alternatively, the courts could incorporate a higher duty of care
requirement into their interpretations of the recreational use statute when
children are involved. Even though the statute takes away the duty of
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care required of landowners toward recreational users and makes no
explicit exception for children, the broad application of the rule that a
higher duty of care is required toward children could provide an
exception to the no-duty requirement toward adult trespassers.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Comment has traced the application of two distinct policies in
California. The policy to provide increased space for recreation to
combat the ever-increasing pressure on public land led to the legislative
enactment of California's recreational use statute. The separate policy
to provide protection to children too young to assume responsibility for
their actions led the courts to adopt the attractive nuisance doctrine. Due
to the limited application of the recreational use statute, the two were
able to coexist over a period of time. However, the broadening of the
application of the recreational use statute, as it currently applies any time
a child trespasses on private property to play, puts the policy of
encouraging open spaces in direct conflict with the policy of protecting
children. In fact, it appears that a new category of individuals toward
whom almost no duty is owed has been created in the trespassing child.
The supreme court does not appear to have taken into consideration the
desire of society to protect young children in its Ornelas decision;
however, the precedent has now been established so that landowners
may no longer be encouraged to maintain safe conditions in areas where
children may be expected to play. A step by the legislature to clarify its
intent in the application of the recreational use statute or the addition of
an exception in favor of young children should be taken to support the
duty of society to care for its children.
KATHRYN
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